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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
JOHN CHRISTY and KATHRYN
E. CHRISTY, Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
EDWARD L. GUILD and MABEL
C. GUILD, Husband and Wife,
Defendants and Appellants

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT
This case "ra.s originally instituted in the City Court
of Salt Lake City as, and we have a.ssu1ned that it
remains, an action in unlawful detainer, seeking
restitution of the premises described in the com..
plaint and damages for unlawful detention thereof. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the
defendants appealed to the District Court and de ..
1nanded a trial by jury.
'rhere is no dispute in the evidence as to the delinquencies of the defendants. It ·app·ears from
the evidence that on January 24, 1935, a sales
agreement of the premises was entered into between
the p·arties. The defendants made a down pa.y..
ment of $20.00 and agreed to pay the balance of
$3,180.00 in monthly installments. In said contract
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defendants a.greed, in addition to paying the monthly installments, to erect certain imp~rovements and
to pay taxes and fire insurance premiums.
On January 16, 1940, the plaintiffs served notice on
the defendants, intending to forfeit the contract,
and, at that time, the defendants made a payment
and promised to keep up the payments and that they
would bring the contract up to date as soon as the
defendant, Edward L. Guild, got a settlement from
the Industrial Commission. (Tr. 12.2-3). The defendants, on March 27, 1940, made an assignment
of their ·contract to their son and daughter. (Tr.
126-7).
The defendants having failed to live up to their
promises, the plaintiffs, on April 30, 1940, served
notice on the defendants forfeiting the contract for
failure to place upon the front of said premises a
porch with a concrete foundation and fire brick
upon the full length of the building located on the
premises, and for failure to remodel and plaster
with California stucco the rear of said building,
for failure to p~ay the monthly installments due on
the 1st days of January, February, March and April,
1940, in the sum of $30.00 per month, and a balance
of $10.00 for the installment due the 1st day of December, 1939, aggregating the total sum of $130.00,
and for failure to p~ay taxes for the yea.rs 1935,
1936, and 1938~ totalling the sum of $293.70, pluH
interest, and insurance in the sum of $13.50.
The testimony is \vithout dispute as to the fore ..
going defaults on the part of the defendants.
The defendants attempted, and now attempt, to
overcome these defaults by making the following
defenses and contentions:
l. That. the plaintiffs had orally agreed to
modify the contract 'vith the defendants,
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because the permanent.improvements aforesaid were considered by the parties as undesirable.
2. That the defendants had made pay1nent
of the delinquent taxes and insurance, by
virtue of defendants' note, Exhibit No. 2.
3. That the defendants were entitled to
equitable consideration because they had
placed Yaluable improvements upon the
premises, and that they had an equity in
the premises because they had made payments over a period of time.
~Phe

foregoing propositions and their merits will
be discussed under the headings above given .

.ARGUMENT
The Modification of a fVritten Contract Relati11rg
to Real Estate j}ftttst Be in Writing and Supported By a Consideration
The defendants, in their brief, assigned as error
the granting by the trial court of plaintiffs' motion
to strike the oral testimony given by the defendants
to the effect that they had talked to the plaintiffs
about the improvements to be erected upon the
front and rear of the building located on said premises and that plaintiffs ag~reed with defendants that
it would not be necessary for them to make such
improvements called for in the contract.
Under the law, a provision to forego the right to
demand performance of a contract would be nudum
pactum and void in the absence of any consideration. A consideration is always necessary. Where
a contract affecting real estate is in writing, any
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modification of such contract must be in writing
and supported by a ·considerat.ion.
·
The defendants failed to show a consideration for
the modification of such contract and that such
lnodifica tion 'vas in writing. In
66 C. J., p. 728, it is stated:
''In accordance with the general rules gov·
erning modification of contracts, in order
to render valid an agreement modifying a
contract for sale of land, or substituting
an entirely new contract in its place, there
must be good and sufficient consideration
and the contract must not be lacking in
mutuality.''
In the same volume, at page 727, it is also stated:
'' . . . Beeause of particular statutory provisions (referring to the Rtatute of frauds),
a written contract of sale of lands cannot
be subsequently modifi~d by parol agreemen t . . . "
See also
80 A. L. R. 540.
29 A. L. R. 1095.
17 A. L. R. 14,
holding that a contract required by a statute of
frauds to be in "rriting cannot be subsequently
1nodified by oral agreement. In 'the case of
Combined Metals v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535;
267 P. 1020, the Court stated:
'''".,.hen the testimony of such additional
oral agreement 'vas offered, Bastian's objections thereto 'vere overruled. We think
the court erred in the ruling. The doctrine
is familiar that when parties put their neg'Otiations into writing, in such terms as imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
port a legal obligation, and on its face a
completed contract, without any uncertainty ns to the object or extent of the engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the
whole of the engagement of the PB:rties and
the extent and manner of their undertaking
have been reduced to w~iting, and that
parol evidence is not admissible to vary or
contradict the tenus of such writing or
add or substitute new or different or a.dditjonal tern1s. !fcCornick v. Levy, 37 Utah
134, 196 P. 669 ; Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah
148: 129 P. 365; l\{idgley v. Camp·bell Bldg.
Co.,· 38 Utah 293, 112 P. 820; 2 Williston
on Contracts, Sec. 633; 10 R. C. L. 1018;
13 c. J. 771. ,, . . . .
''Again, the original contract to be binding
and enforceable, and to· satisfy the statute
of frauds, was required to be, a.s it was,
in writing and subscribed by the parties
sought to be charged. To alter or modify
any of its material parts or terms by a subsequent agreement required one also to be
in writing and so subscribed, especially
the alleged agreement whereby Bastian, if
successful in his litigation \vith Woolley,
'vas to convey to plaintiffs an interest in
and to the ranch in lieu of the bank stock
and of the sugar company note. Lincoln
Realty Co. v. Garden City, 94 Neb. 346, 143
N. W. 230, Ann. Cass. 1914D, 342; Price
v. McDowell, 52 Okl. 608, 153 P. 649 ; Notes
L. R. A. 1917B, 141. Neither part p·erformance nor anything done by p~laintiffs
in reliance on the subsequent agreements is
n11 eg;ed or nroven by them.''
Hogan v. Swaze, 65 Utah 380; 237 P. 1097.
6 R. C. L., p. 915-18, ~ec. 298-301.
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Unlawful Detainer is Purely a Statutory Proceeding at Law, and Does Mot arnd Cannot Involve
the Exercise of Equitable Ju1"isdiction

The defendants complain and assign as error the
trial court's refusal to allow the defendants to show
that they had ren1odeled the building and made improvements at an alleged value of t\vo thousand
dollars. These improvements were not ·called for
in the contract bet\veen the parties. They were
voluntary improvements made for defendants' own
purposes which in no way could give them an equity.
Drollinger v. Carson, 155 P. 923.
Neither the alleged improvements nor any alleged
equity the defendants might claim was subject to
consideration in this action. The only issue in an
unlawful detainer is the right of possession. The
contract in this ·case p·rovides that in the event of
the forfeiture of the contract for the purchasers'
default in the performance thereof they shall herome tenants at will; and, in this respect, it Is
similar to the contract involved in
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137; 2·92 P. 206.
In 26 C. J., p. 840, dealing with forcible
entry and detainer, it is stated:
'' . . . Since these actions are purely actions at law not involving the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction~ unless there is special statutory authority therefor, equitable
dPfenses are not available in th·ese ac.
,,
t lOllS . . •
In Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304 ; 237
P. 217,
the defendant claimed that although he conveyed
the premises in question, he "\\'as, nevertheless, the
owner thereof, because he executed a deed to the
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plaintiff through threats, frauds and duress, and
the deed 'vas therefore void. The Court held that
such proof 'vas inadmissible to sup,port said de·
fense, and that the defendant's remedy was to in·
stitute an action in a court of equity to determine
his rights to the premises.
The Court stated :
"Proceedings under the forcib~e entry and
detainer statute are in :a class by themselves. Such proceedings can generally
be instituted in all inferior -courts and
courts of special and limited jurisdiction,.
and are intended to afford a speedy and
!ldequate remedy to obtain the possession
of real estate by the landlord against his
tenant." . . . .
". . . In 16 R. C. L. 1186, Sec. 708, it is
clearly pointed out that in unlawful detainer proceedings the tenant can only avail
himself of the defenses that the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist
by reason of the invalidity of the lease
under 'vhich the landlord claims, or that
there is no lease or contract to pay rent of
. any kind, or that no rent is p~ast due. In
some jurisdiction~, however, if it becomes
necessary for the tenant to show tha.t for
some adeauate equitable reason he should
not pay the rent or be ousted from the
premises he may enjoin the summary proceeding and bring an action in a court of
general jurisdiction to test the equities and
hold the summary proceeding in suspense
until such action is determined. As a matter of course, in this jurisdiction the tenant
may at any time institute an action in a
· court of equity to determine his right~ k>
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the premises in question. He may, however, not remain in possession of the
premises as tenant and nevertheless dispute the title of his landlord. And that
is true in any kind of an action.'' In
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398; 250 P.
982, the Court stated:
''The remedy or procedure available to a
defendant in an unlawful detainer action,
-'for the p~rotection and enforcement of any
equity or right, he may have in the premises, is pointed out by this Court in Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304; 237 P. 217
. . . ' ' In the ·Course of the opinion in
that case, it is said:
'In 16 R. C. L. 1186, Sec. 708, it is clearly
pointed out that, in unla,vful detainer proceedings, the tenant can only avail himself
of the defenses that the relationship of
landlord and tenant does not exist by reason of the invalidity of the lease under
which the landlord claims, or that there is
no• lease or contract to pay rent of any kind,
that no rent is past due.'

or

"It is then pointed out that, in some juris-·
dictions, whenever it becomes necessary
for a tenant to show that there is an equitable reason 'vhy he Rhou]d not pay rent or
be ousted from the premises, the tenant
mav enjoin the summary proceeding by an
action in a court of general jurisdjction to
determine the equities and hold the sunlmary proceeding· in suspense until such
action is determined.''
See also
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137; 292 P. 206.
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lf the defendants felt that they had an equity in the
premises, their remedy, as pointed out in the foregoing cases, 'vas to file an action in equity to enjoin the unlawful detainer action brought by the
plaintiffs, and if they were entitled to any equities,
they would have been considered.
The plaintiffs' action wa.s first filed in the City
Court on May 23., 1940, and was appealed to the
District Court by ihe defendants,. a.nd the case heard
on September 13, 1940. There wa.s a period of four
months in vlhich the defendants were afforded the
opportunity to protect any alleged Equities they
claimed by invoking the ex.ercise of equitable jurisdiction by a prop~er action.
In their brief the defendants state that the ''only
-3ign of equitable consideration given by the court
may be found on pages 28 to 30 of the abstract,''
wherein the court gave the defendants a 'veek's
time to pay the total amount due on the contract,
plus attorneys' fees and costs. A reading of the
record will definitely show that· the defendants
themselves made the proposition of paying out the
contract, attorneys' fees and costs, if the plaintiffs
consented to give them a week's time in order to
get the money. ~t\.fter plaintiffs' acceptance of the
defendants' offer the court continued the case for
one week and held the jury during all of that time
to accommodate them. The ''equitable considerat·ion'' 'vas a proposition of settlem~nt between the
parties and not the exercise of any equitable; power
on th~ part of the court, as this 'vas a legal action
under which the defendants deinanded a trial by
,iury. (Tr. 155-8; 191).
While 've believe the Utah cases, cited above, are
sufficient authority on the question, "\\""e take the
liberty of citing to the Court some cases from other
jurisdietions illustrating this point. In
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36 C. J., page 651, it is stated:
''While it is held under some statutes that
a summary p1roceeding by the landlord to
dispossess his tenant cannot be enjoined
or stayed by any writ from any court, it
is generally held. that, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, a court of equity
has jurisdiction to enjoin the proceedings.
The court will exercise its jurisdiction in a
·Case calling for the exercise of equ1table
relief, as where the tenant is without an
adequate remedy at law, where he has
equities which he cannot assert in the sum.
mary procee d1ngs
. . . . ''
Phillips v. Port Townsend Lode, etc.,
(Wash.), 36 P. 476.
Yukon Inv. Co. v. Crescent Mea.t Co.,
(Wash.), 248 P. 377.
Peoples' lVIortgage Corp. v. "\\"ilton, (Mich.)
208 N. W. 60.
0 'Brien v. 0 'Brien, 195 Ill. App. 346.
Aegerter v. Hayes (S. D.), 226 N. W. 345.
Dysart v. Enslo,v, ( Okl.), 54 P. 550.
The contract between the parties shows that the defendants' down payment was $20.00. The evident
consideration, as sho"\vn by the record, was that
the defendants erect and make the permanent improvements to the front and back of the building,
as sp·ecified in the contract, which improvements
the defendants failed to make. Under these cir ..
(;Umstances the defendants had no equity justifying
an interference by a court of equity. The judg.
ment in this case, giving the plaintiffs possession
of the premises, is not inequitable.
Heard v. Gephart, (Kan.), 233 P. 1044.
Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332; 135 P. 98.
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The defendants stipulated at the trial that the reasonable rental Yalue of the premises \Yas $75.00 per
tnonth; the monthly payment under the contract
·'-Vas $30.00 per month. The evidence further shows
that the plaintiffs were very lenient "\\"ith the defendants, and it is inconceivable how the defendants c&ll clain1 that the plaintiffs dealt harshly with
them, \Yhen it appears that they deliberately refused to pay the installments, taxes, and insurance
when they had on hand $1200.00 or $1300.00, received from the Industrial Commission. We will
say more on this subje-ct later in this brief.

The Acceptance of the Defendants' Note, (Defendants' Exhibit 2), By the Plaintiffs Did Not Constitute Payment or Discharge the Debt, or Affect
the Contractural Rights Between the Parties.
Seemingly, the defendants' chief defense in this
suit was based upon the theory that the taxes and
insurance p·remiums had been paid by the defend~
ants by reason of plaintiffs' acceptance of Exhibit
2 in the sum of $485.82, and, by virtue of such in. .
strument, they "rere not delinquent in such item~.
The terms stated on the note itself are a complete
r.uswer to the defendants' contention. It specifi..
cally states that it is not in payment of delinquent
payments due under the terms of the contract and
does not in any \vay alter, modify, or chan,ge any
of the conditions of ~aid contract. Referring to
a part of said defendants' Exhibit 2, among other
things, it reads as follo,vs:

"It is expressly understood that it has no
connection \vha tsoever with the contract,
Y/herein \ve, the undersigned, are purchas1np; from said payees certain real estate
locat(\d in Salt I...~ake City, Utah, and this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
note does not in any way alter, modify,
or change any of the conditions set forth
in said contract, nor is i.t in payment of delinquent payments due under the terms of
said contract . . . .
(Signed)
(Signed)

E. L. GUILD,
•
MABEL GUILD''

In 21 R. C. L., Sec. 70, p. 70, on the subject of payment by note of debtor, it
is stated:
''The general rule is tha.t a note given by
a debtor for a precedent debt will not be
held to extinguish the debt, in the absence
of an agreement to that effect, but will he
considered as conditional payment or as
collateral security, or as an acknowledge. .
ment or memorandum of the amount ascertained to be due . . . "
In 48 C. J., page 610, it is stated:
' ' The rule obtaining in most jurisdictions
is that, in the absence of agreement or consent to receive it as such, a draft or bill
of exchange, although accepted by the
dra.,vee, or a promissory note· of the debtor,
or his acceptance of a draft or bill of
exchange dra-\vn upon him, does not in itself constitute payment or amount to a discharge of the debt . . . ''
Similar contentions were made by the purchasers
of certain real estate in the case of
Malmstrom v. Second East Apartment Co.,
74 Utah ·206; 278 P. 811, wherein the
Court stated:
"It is claimed· that the plaintiff w,aived
'vhatever rights he had under the forSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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feiture provisions of the contract by accepting tlle note above Inentioned for soine of
the installments and other iteins, by accepting~ post-dated checks for son1e ot the payments at the conference had in l_\la.rch or
April when the note was given, and by
accepting payments throughout the period
of Joseph Fargeson's possession after
they were due. 'l,he defense of waiver was
not set up in the pleadings in the case,
and "\Ve might brush the question aside on
that ground. But we prefer to dispose of
it on the merits. The evidence upon the
point, considered as a whole, d,oes not support the claim. In the first place, as to the
note, the Gargesons failed to make the
first payment provided for therein. While
the acceptance of the note extended the
time for payment of the items which it includes, it should not be held to constitute
a waiver in case the Fargesons failed to
pay the note. A seller does not waive his
right to rescind the contract, or, as in this
case, to recover possession of the property
by granting to the purchaser an extension
of time in which to make p~ayment, if th~
purchaser refuses to pay when the time
fixed by the new agreement ha.s elapsed. 29
Cyc. 1393; Machoid v. Farman, 14 Idaho
258, 94 P. 170; Boulder & B. Placer Co. v.
Maxwell, et al, 24 Colo. 87, 48 P. 815.
. . . The impression made upon the mind
of this writer by a reading.. of the entire
record many times is that M~l1mstrom showed a commendable spirit of forbearance
to\vard the Fargesons all through his dealings with them; but that he nevertheless intended at all times to maintain all his
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rights under the contract. It would certainly not be just for us to now say to him
that, because he had been lenient toward
his debtors, he had thereby lost his right
to the possession of his own property to
one "\vho failed or refused to make the payments stipulated in the contract."
ln view of the express stipulations on the part of
the defendants that the note did not constitute pay..
ment and did not in any way affect the contract in
any manner, we cannot see any merit in the defendants' contention that it w.a.s payment of the
items claimed by them.

rn the statement set forth at the outset of our brief,
we pointed out that on January 18, 1940, the defendants had been served with notices terminating the
contra,ct upon the same grounds that tlie contract
was finally tenninated, and we also pointed out
that on March 27, 1940, the defendants assigned all
their right, title and interest in said contract to
their son and daughter, (of which assignment the
plaintiffs ·were not notified).
In the meantime the defendants made small sub..
Requent p1ayments and also made promises that
they would pay up all delinquent payments as soon
as Mr. Guild received a settlement from the Industrial Commission, which settlerrlent amounted to
$1200.00 or $1300.00. When this settlement was
made with Mr. Guild, and before this suit was filed
by the plaintiffs, the defendants tendered to the
plaintiffs the sum of $130.00. Although, at that
time, they were in default in the sum of $160.00, the
defendants refused to pay the taxes, and the in~
surance premiums and urged the plaintiffs to bring
suit against them on the note. It is a very apparent fact that the defendants 'vere trying ~o defeat
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
the plaintiffs from collecting the items mentioned
in the note by taking· the stand that the note was
payment and, in vie'v of the assignment to their
son and daughter, a judgment based on the note
would be worthless and uncollectible.
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs had not accepted Ex11ibit 2 as payment. In spite of this note, there were
other grounds (which are set forth in the notices
terminating the contract) which were ample fror
forfeiting the same; that is, the failure to pay the
monthly installments and their failure to ere-ct the
jmprovements stipulated in the contract. Partial
payments or offers to perform are unavailing.
Cassiday v. Adamson, (Iowa), 224 N. W.
508.
Great \\T estern Inv. Co. v. Anderson,
(Wash.), 297 P. 1087.

It would be permissible for the defendants to prove,
if they could, that they were not in default in the
perfonnance of any of the covenants in the contract which the plaintiffs have alle,g•ed they (the defendants) were in default, and that they perfonned,
or tendered performance, before the forfeiture of
the contract.

Great

''r

estern Inv. Co. v. Anderson,
(Wash.), 297 P. 1087.
Dineen v. Olson, (Kan.), 85 P. 538.
Haile v. Smith, (Cal.), 45 P. 872.
Schubert v. Lowe, (Cal.), 223 P. 550.
The evidence is undisputed that the defendants
were in default in all of the items stated in the
notices of forfeiture.
There are several assignments of error that this
Court should not consider. The assignments numbered 7, 8, and 10 are, according to numerous deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cis ions of the court, too general and indefinite ; besides assignments of error, such as the assignments
here numbered 7 and 10, merely attack the judgment. The assignment of error numbered 9 should
not be considered, for the reason that the objection
thereby urged was not presented to or passed upon
by the trial court, by pleading, as it might have
been (White v. Century Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 28
Utah 311, 78 P. 868; ·Busby v. Century Gold Min.
Co., 2'7 Utah 231, 75 P. 725), nor was the question
of the reasonableness or sufficiency of the notice
of forfeiture, as to time, form, or otherwise, an
issue litigated on the trial. These -are questions
tltat cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah 334; 108
P. 113.2.
Summit County v. Gustaveson, 18 Utah 351;
54 P. 977.
We do not find that appellants have dis·cussed the
7th or lOth assignments in their brief.
As to the subject of the 8th assignment of ej~l or,
viz., that ''the court erred in refusing to con::;ider
the equitable issues presented by the pleadings,''
the appellants, in describing the contents of their
answer, say, that they admit that they a.greed to
make certain improvements, and the plaintiffs had,
after execution of the contract, considered the improvements specified in the contract to be undesirable, and had waived the provisions of the con. .
tract with respect thereto; and they say, that thP
defendants had made improvements on the property to the approximate cost and value of $2,000.
The app,ella.nts further ·say: ''The evidence was in
conflict as to the waiver of the contract require ..
ments regarding the building of the front porch
and stuccoing of the rear. The defendants offered
proof to the effect that they had, since the exocu
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tion of the contract, improved the property to the
extent of $2,000." And, finally, they say, "''l'he
pleadings disclose issues upon the following· questions: . . . ( 6) \\"']1ether in equity the court should
declare a forfeiture of a contract for the purchase
of a house and lot upon which more than one-third
of the p~rincipal amount has been paid and where
$2,000 in valuable improvements have been pla.Jed
on the property. ''
Disregarding the rule which prevails in this and a
majority of the States, that equitable defenses arc..~
not admissible in actions of unlawful detainer, and
assuming that the defendants have some equity, the
latter does not exist by reason of the so-called improvements made by them. Even in California,
where the courts recognize equitable defenses in
actions for the recovery of possession of real property, it has been held tha.t the making of such ltu
provements is no defense, and in
Haile v. Smith, 128 Cal. 415; 60 P. 1032,
an action of ejectment by a vendor ag·ainst a de
faulting vendee, the Court said:
''He (defendant) :received posse.s~ion of
the land from respondent under the ·contract, and can retain possession only by
fulfilling his . covenants which he therein
made. He cannot keep both the land and
the purchase money. It is not necessary,
therefore, for the purposes of this case, to
determine definitely 'vhether or not respondent had a good and sufficient title. If
appellant desired to retain the possession_
'vhich he acquired under the contract, he
should have comp,lied with his p·art of it.
Whatever cause of action he may have for
•
the purchase money which he paid and for
the value of his improvements is another
4
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matter. .lt constitutes no defense to the
present action.'' In
Drollinger v. Carson, 97 Kan. 502;- 155 P.
92'3, heretofore cited, the Court said:
''The only basis for a claim that the judgment is inequitable on the facts is a sh9wing that the defendants had expended $900
in the improvement of the property. Much
of this expenditure - perhap~s $200 - was
for items of ordinary rep~airs and maintenance, such as papering and painting,
whic4 serve·d the purpose of the occupants
as much as that of the owner. Some of
it - possibly a greater amount - was for
changes 'which would not necessarily add to
the value of the real estate, at least in p1ro-..
portion to their cost, and which may not
have been desired hy the plaintiff."
And further :
One who occupies land under a contract,.
providing that he shall have the title upon
completing the purchase price, but must
give up the prop,erty if he makes default,
has no absolute right with resp·ect to improvements he may make. His agreement
gives him none, and the occup~ying -claim..
ant's act . . . does not apply, for he is not
within its letter or spirit. 16 A. & E.
Encycl. of L. 96. · The ordinary rule is that
he is allo,ved no compensation for his betterments, although there are cases to the contrary. 16 A. & E. Encycl. of L. 97; ~9 Cyc.
1401. Whatever concession is made to him
in this regard must result from circumstances rendering it inequitable that he
should lose his entire investment - a matter to he determined upon the facts of each
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particular case. The trial court evidently
concluded that, inasn1nch as the defendants
had had the use of the property during
the period of more than five years tha.t the
contract had been in force, equity did not
require any allowance to them on account
of "~hat they had invested in permanent
improvements.
In Kansas, as in California, equitable defenses are
admissible in unlawful detainer actions. In both
States, it is settled that justices of the peace are
without equitable jurisdiction or power, and an action of forcible detainer must be determined as an
action at law.
Dineen v. Olson, 73 Kan. 379; 85 P. 538.
Linder v. Warnock, 91 Kan. 272; 137 P.
962; Ann. Cas. 1915C 314.
Richmond v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App.
62; 98 P. 57.
Schubert v. Lowe, 1931 Cal. 291; 223 P.
550.
In the Dineen case, it was held that ''for the purpose of determining the right of possession, questions of title, legal or equitable, may be incidentally considered;'' but that, ''if, outside of the question of possession, he has rights concerning crops,
improvements, or of any other nature, they can be
adjusted in any app,ropriate pToceeding without
embarrassment on account of this judgment, as it
is not a bar to any after action brought by either
party.'' However, the general rule in both States
is, that if title, either legal or equitable, is involved;
as in suits between vendor and vendee, growing out
of a contract of sale, they must be tried in a court
of general jurisdiction.
Linder v. Warnock, supra.
Richmond v. Superior Court, supra.
I
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In an unlawful detainer action the only issue is the
right of possession (Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah
304, 237 P. 217; Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 736,
10 P. ( 2d) 323; Aegerter v. Hayes, 55 S. D. 337,
226 N. W. 345; William Weisman Holding Co. v.
1\tiller, 152 lVIinn. 320, 188 N. W. 732) and if other
issues are injected into an action for the possession of real 'property, which at first was one of unla,wful detainer, it becomes an action in ejectment
or to quiet title.
Henderson v. Miglietta, 206 Cal. 125 ; 273
P. 581.
Thompson v. Reynolds,· 53 Utah 437; 174
P. 164.
And so, as was held in
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398; 250 P.
982,
if there is any equitable reason why the tenant
should not he ousted, he must institute an action in
a court of general jurisdiction to determine the
equities ; and, if he does, the Court can determine
such questions as were determined in
Croft v. Jensen. 86 Utah 13; 40 P. (2d) 198.
But, in such a plenary action by the defendants here,
we do not believe the question of their improvements of the p·roperty involved would be of consequence, especially in view of contract provision
that in case of their default, any improvements
made by them shall be· forfeited to the vendor.
27 R. C. L., Sec. 428.
66 c. J. 1050.
Pillow v. M·cLean, (Tex. Civ. App. ), 91
s. w. (2d) 898.
Chowchilla Col. Co. v. Thompson, 39 Cal.
App. 517; 179 P. 411. In
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
Herpel v. Herpel, 162 Mich. 606; 127 N. W.
763,
the Court held, that "·here complainant sold land
to defendant on monthly payments for the life of
the complainant, and reserved a life estate, permanent improvements n1ade by defendant of his
pwn accord "ill be presumed to have been made;
for his own benefit, and so not to entitle him to
credit therefor on such payments. And see
Cent. Dig. Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 413.
Dec. Dig. Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 201.
And when the question of such imp~rovements is
properly in issue, the inquiry relates to the extent
to which the value of the p-roperty has been enhanced by the improvements, not the cost to the
purchaser.

Tyler v. Burgeson, 229 Mich. 2'68; 201
N. W. 185.
Collins v. Creason, 55 Or. 524; 106 P. 445.
66 C. J. 796, Sees. 412-419.
27 R ..· C. L.. 665, Par. 428.
While the defendants allege that the provision of
the contract as to building and remodeling porches
was '' waivedj '' no facts showing such waiver are
Plleged, and they ignore the rule that such provisions are not the suhject of waiver. If the making
of such improvements were dispensed with, it
must have been by an agreement modifying the contract in that respect ; and, as we have shown, such
agreement must have been in writing and upon a
sufficient consideration. The reason is, as stated in
l\{cKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260; 24
N. E. 458.
8 L. R. A. 257; 17 Am. St. Rep. 638,
"that it is not safe or prudent to permit
the (written) ·contract to be modified or
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changed by the testimony of witnesses as
to the parol statements or agreements of
parties. ''
The distinction is between the contract itself and
subsequent performance,
Scheerschmidt v. Smith, 74 Minn. 224; 77
N. W. 34,
The appellant, Edward L. Guild, by his own testi·
mony conclusively proves the default as to the im·
provements. In reciting the conver.sation upon
which appellants rely as a "\Vaiver of this provision,
this appellant said: ·

"Vle told them "\Vhat we intended to do was
to make a small porch at the entrance but
not complete the porch as we had agreed .
on in the first place. We did not do anything with the porch.'' (Ab. 16-17; Tr. 116).
So if we assume the claim of appellants as to a
modification the testimony is conclusive that the
1nodification, as proposed by appellants, was not
complied with and the default as to this was
complete.
CONCLUSION
In this case appellants went into the possession of
the property of respondents, and had a right to remain in possession only so long a.s they complioo
ith the provisions of the contract under which
they obtained possession. i
7
\\

The sole question is whether they were in default.
BTandley v. Lewis, 92 P (2d) 338.
The complaint sets forth a straight unlawful detainer action. The answer) when shaken down to
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the adn1issible elements of defense in this character
of action, sets up two alleged defenses:
1. That the default in the agreement to
make in1prove1nents 'Yas "raived.
2. That there ,,~at' no default of payments
on tht~ con tract or of taxes or of insur~
ance premiums because a note was given.
lt will be noticed that the right of re-possession in
case of any of these four defaults is absolute in
ihis agreement. The existence of all four defaults
is established here bevond
controversv and in such
.
a ''Tay that the jury could not have found otherwise,
and if so found, the court would have been called
upon to set aside the verdict.
The default as to improvements is admitted as
above shown. The default of payment upon the
agreement was so clear as to involve no question for
the jury.
~

Appellants relied upon a tender of $130.00, but admit that the default would have been in excess of
this except for the note of $485.82. Now in addi·
tion to the fact that the note itself recites tliat it
:s not
''in payment of delinquent payments due
under the terms of said contract''
and, of course, no court or jury "\vould be permitted
to find contrary to this expressed intention, appel·
!ants make the contention that the pen notations on
the note are part of the note, but the pen notations themselves show that no part of this $485.82
was in any way related to the installment pay-ments on this rontract. The pen notations further
show included in this sum was $130.00 for lumber
admittedly procured by respondents for app,ellants,
~nd "rhen this $130.00 is deducted from the face of
this note the $130.00 tender claimed was obviously
insufficient. This is clear beyond dispute and is
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decisive of this default, assuming everything that
appellants claim with relation to this not~.
Now as to the third default, that is on taxes, it is
admitted the taxes "\\ ere not paid other\vise than
by giving the note, hut the parties agreed that the
note "ras not a p~ayment.
The note itself was never paid, nor ~-as the portion
of the note relating to taxes paid, and the authorities hereinabove recited are conclusive that even
under appellants' o"rn contention, this default
therefore remains.
7

What we have just said 'vith relation to taxes
applies also to the default as to insurance.
So that appellants, by their own agreements and
their own defaults 1 terminated their right to remain in possession of this property.
The assignn1ents as to admission of testirnony becomes totally immaterial because the interior iruprovements are nowhere involved in this case either
by pleading or othenvise, and are exc] uded by the
nature of the action.
The other question as to an offer on accruing installments 'vas of no materiality because the only
offer pleaded was the $130.00 hereinabove referred
to. The question itself called for a conclusion.
Appellants could not have been prejudiced by the
striking of testimony as to modification, because
their o·\\'"11 testimony sho,ved the default in that
respect.
The contention as to the court imposing attorneys'
fees is totally immaterial. In the first place appellants agreed to this suggestion by the court, (Tr.
191) and in the second place no attorneys' fees are
jmposed in the judgment appealed from.
The contention that there was a question of fact as
to whether payments on this contract applied to the
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·current month or to the back payments is not "'ell
taken. App·ellants themselves introduced Exhibit
1 sho,Ying not only the application of these payments upon their contract, but also showing their
default as to taxes and interest.
Payn1ents, in the absence of an agreement, are presumed to be applied just as they were applied in
this exhibit. 'rhere \Yas no evidence to the contrary, and as stated, the default as to these pa,ylnents was conclusive according to appellants' own
testimony.
There ''Tas no question of fact as to whether the
note was given in payment of installments as contended by appellants, because the note on its face
and including the notations, which it is claimed by
appellants should be included, show conclusively
that it \Vas not to be applied, nor was any element
of installment payments involved in it.
There \Yas no question of intention on this note
which could have been submitted to the jury, or on
which any contrary findings could be sustained.
The construction of these written documents was
~~or the court.
The other question which appellants suggest should
have been submitted to the jury was the default in
1naking the improvements, and as already shown,
this default was admitted.
The written exhibits in this case, controlling upon
the parties here, are conclusive of the rights of the
parties. There could have been no other determination in this case involving the sole question of right
of possession, and the other incidental question of
damages not argued by appellants.
'Ve respectfully submit that the judgment should be
affirmed.

H. G. MEtrOS,
H. L. MULLINER,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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